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Abstract  
In developed countries, education, like medical provision, is a key focus of 
social welfare. Recent years have seen a tendency to compare education to 
medicine in the call for evidence-based policy and practice. The problematical 
aspects of this are significant and have been explored elsewhere. This essay 
suggests an area for more fruitful comparison between the two domains: a 
consideration of how the ethical principles informing the medical profession 
might shed light on the ethics of gifted education. 
 
Since the time of Hippocrates medical practitioners have been concerned to 
ground their activities in a set of ethical principles that govern the doctor–
patient relationship and reflect wider conceptions of a good society. These 
principles may be grouped into four key areas: 
• respect for autonomy 
• beneficence 
• non-maleficence (doing no harm) 
• justice. 
 
This essay considers the extent to which these principles overlap with, and 
might inform, the ethics of gifted education. In particular, it seeks to identify 
and explore key ethical issues and tensions in gifted education related to 
them, including: 
• respect for autonomy: consent and the right to underachieve  
• beneficence: what good is done by gifted education, and to whom 
• non-maleficence: the character and competing claims of potential harms to 
gifted students and others 
• justice: equal rights for giftedness as a special educational need; 
distributive justice and parity of esteem. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the search for ‘evidence-based’ models of educational 
practice in the UK has fostered a tendency among governmental advisory 
bodies to look to medical paradigms. While this has prompted discussion 
around the issues of comparing ‘hard’ medical science and ‘softer’ educational 
research, there has been no effort to shift the focus to the ethical 
commonalities of the two domains. I would like to suggest that, for a number 
of reasons, a consideration of medical ethics is helpful in understanding 
issues in educational ethics. Gifted education by its very nature exemplifies 
key issues in educational ethics, raising questions such as: 
• What is education for? 
• Who is it for? 
• How is it to be provided equitably? 
• How are conflicts between the interests of different groups to be settled? 
 
Why look at medical ethics? 
Medical ethics is a well-established field of applied ethics in a parallel social 
welfare domain. As with education, in medicine the stakes are high. Medical 
provision, like education, is regarded as a key indicator of a civilised society, 
and public expenditure, at least in developed countries, is considerable. Both 
medical and educational issues represent crucial areas of public concern and 
political debate. 
 
In addition, medical ethics is a well-established field of professional ethics with 
resonance for education. In both fields, commitment to public service is an 
important motivator for practitioners. Both fields share features with regard to 
the practitioner–client relationship, which is characterised by professional 
expertise and authority on the part of the practitioner, and a degree of 
vulnerability on the part of the recipient. The power dynamic is unequal; both 
patients and pupils must take what is on offer. To guard against potential 
abuses of this situation, doctors traditionally take the Hippocratic Oath; nurses 
and other healthcare practitioners have equivalent codes of conduct. Similarly, 
the teaching profession requires demonstration of rigorous standards of 
conduct before individuals are admitted. 
 
Neither medicine nor education is a purely personal endeavour. The 
experiences of recipients and practitioners alike are influenced by cultural, 
structural, and policy issues. Both medicine and education reflect their times, 
key issues are often contested, and abundant historical examples illustrate 
that the approved practices of one age are often seen in hindsight to be 
erroneous or even inhumane.   
 
Of course gifted education, like education as a whole, has its own set of 
burning ethical issues, including those of definition, excellence versus elitism, 
inclusiveness and social justice. These are hotly debated, as they should be. 
But discussion quickly becomes channelled into established adversarial 
discourses and entrenched positions. Medical ethics has generated a 
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thoughtful and provocative literature, and its example provides educators with 
the opportunity to look beyond the parameters of our own field to see what 
relevant lessons might be learned. 
 
Principle-based and virtue-based ethics 
There are two main approaches in medical ethics: principle-based and virtue-
based. The principle-based approach relies on the consideration and 
application of general ethical values. The authors of a leading textbook on 
medical ethics note that ‘A set of principles in a moral account should function 
as an analytical framework that expresses the general values underlying rules 
in the common morality. These principles can then function as guidelines for 
professional ethics.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2001:12). 
 
The virtue-based approach grounds its arguments in the characters of the 
individuals involved in particular ethical situations. Its proponents claim that 
considering ‘What the moral person should do’ allows important emotional and 
interpersonal issues to be considered, and addresses the complexity and 
specificity of ethical issues better than a principle-based position. 
 
In this essay, I consider the principle-based approach. Principle-based ethics 
emphasises action, while virtue ethics focuses on the person performing the 
action. Some commentators emphasise the complementarity of principle- and 
virtue-based ethics. I accept this refinement and would not wish to discount 
the importance of the virtue-based approach. Nevertheless, in this brief 
discussion, I feel there is much to be learned from the principles informing 
medical ethics. Ethics is about moral decision-making, and many of the key 
issues in gifted education, explicitly or implicitly, are about weighing the 
competing moral claims of one course of action against another. 
 
My discussion is based around the four fundamental principles identified by 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001), and discussed in Ranaan Gillon’s clear and 
helpful short book, Philosophical Medical Ethics (1985). These four principles 
are: 
• respect for autonomy 
• non-maleficence 
• beneficence 
• justice. 
 
These ‘general values underlying rules in the common morality’ may be 
justified by ‘deontological’ and/or ‘consequentialist’ arguments. Deontological 
arguments appeal to duties (for example the moral duties arising from 
religious adherence). The most well-known secular statement of a 
deontological position is Kant’s categorical imperative, briefly summarised as: 
• we should treat other human beings as ends in themselves, rather than as 
means to ends, and  
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• we should behave in a way that we would be willing to have universally 
applied (A simplified version of this is the Golden Rule: ‘Do as you would 
be done by.’) 
 
Consequentialist arguments are based on the outcomes of actions. The most 
important formulation of this stance is utilitarianism, expressed in notions such 
as maximising pleasure and minimising pain, and promoting ‘the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number’. 
 
Several other important moral formulations relevant to medical and 
educational ethics will be considered in the section on justice. In the next 
section, I briefly consider the principles of respect for autonomy and 
beneficence, and suggest issues in gifted education to which they might 
relate. I focus at greater length on the principles of non-maleficence and 
justice, before concluding with a consideration of ways of deciding among the 
claims of competing principles, and a description of the features of ethically 
defensible programmes of gifted education. 
 
Respect for autonomy 
Respect for autonomy – sometimes termed respect for the person – is the 
principle which, in Gillon’s view, takes precedence over the other principles, 
all things being equal. The preferences of patients regarding their own 
medical treatment, while not necessarily definitive, are a crucial factor guiding 
doctors’ actions and decisions. This principle of respect can be justified both 
on deontological and consequentialist grounds, and balances the unequal 
power relationship between doctor and patient. 
 
In medicine, the principle of respect does not of course justify complete 
patient autonomy in dictating medical treatment. Circumstances that curtail 
this include: 
• the superior professional knowledge and experience of practitioners  
• the need for patients’ preferences to be restricted to medically effective 
and defensible options 
• the need for patients to be legally and mentally adults. 
 
Respect for the person entails respect for the range and variety of crucial 
differences among people. Applied to education, it calls for respect for the 
differences causing variations of ability at higher as well as lower levels than 
the norm – and by extension demands provision appropriate to these 
differences. It calls for respect for unrealised potential as well as 
demonstrated achievement, and for educational responses that address the 
full range of a child’s or young person’s needs, including social and emotional 
ones. 
 
Key issues related to the principle of respect for autonomy include informed 
consent and the right to make independent choices and to refuse 
interventions. Clearly children and young people are not fully autonomous 
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individuals either in a developmental or legal sense, and may not have the 
ability to make fully autonomous choices. They are, however, on a continuum 
of autonomy, and have preferences, desires and an ability to make choices 
that are autonomous to some degree. Even given the crucial differences 
between schooling and medical care, and between the right to consent 
between children and adults, issues of consent also pertain to gifted 
education. 
 
Research evidence on the preferences of gifted students to control their own 
learning is compelling. Respect for autonomy requires educators to consult 
the preferences of young people, including gifted students, about schooling. 
The current personalisation agenda and interest in ‘pupil voice’ are examples 
of efforts to apply this principle to educational policy. 
 
A critical aspect of autonomy is the right to refuse interventions. In terms of 
gifted education, this might mean a young person’s decision not to participate 
in a programme or to underachieve. One team of researchers has studied the 
motivations of a group of ‘underperformers’ in mainstream schooling in British 
Columbia and described their decisions as ‘honourable’ (primarily because the 
classroom provision they received failed to allow them sufficient discretion 
over the pace and content of their learning) (Kanevsky and Keighley 2003). 
 
Beneficence  
According to Gillon, beneficence – proactively doing good – is the principle 
entailing the weakest moral obligation on doctors.  This is not to say that 
practitioners should not aim for beneficial outcomes of their treatments. But 
even a brief consideration of doctors ‘doing good’ against their patients’ 
wishes (forcing a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness, for example) 
raises issues as to whose conception of ‘good’ should prevail. It also 
illustrates the fact that one ethical principle can conflict with another in such a 
way that one of them must be contravened. In the example of the Jehovah’s 
Witness, medical benefit is at odds with respect for the patient’s autonomy. 
Even if everyone agreed that a doctor’s actions were nothing but good, 
however, a kind of triage of beneficence, informed by other, superordinate 
principles, would still be required to determine which good the doctor should 
undertake first. Issues such as these demonstrate that beneficence often 
needs to be bounded or directed by other principles. 
 
Nevertheless, we should still consider gifted education programmes in terms 
of the good they produce. We may ask first, whether they do any good at all, 
and second, how we are to judge this question. I am using the term ‘good’ 
here to mean positive benefit to relevant individuals or groups of people. This 
raises a third question: who has the right to be considered a relevant person 
in this determination of benefits? In other words, who should benefit? 
 
Few educators would disagree that the main purpose of gifted education 
programmes should be to benefit their recipients – children and young people 
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of high ability. It is notable, however, how often this deontological grounding is 
subordinated in public discussion to instrumental arguments that emphasise 
the benefits to society as a whole, to a country’s global competitiveness, and 
so on. This is certainly the case where gifted education programmes are 
publicly funded. As Carl Rogers put it, ‘Wasting the potential of a gifted mind 
is reckless for a society in desperate need of creativity and inventiveness’.  
 
It is outside the scope of this discussion to propose tests for ascertaining the 
benefits of gifted education programmes. Fair and accurate evaluations are 
difficult, and must certainly be context-specific. They raise issues such as: 
• who evaluates and who sets the terms of reference 
• what is the balance of interests between individual recipients and society 
• how long should programmes be allowed to run before they are judged 
• who sets the standards against which they are assessed. 
 
In practice, standards for publicly funded programmes are most often confined 
to ‘key performance indicators’ such as percentages of students with high 
marks on tests, high grade point averages and so on. If there are other, social, 
benefits included among the aims of a programme, such as social justice for 
gifted disadvantaged students, the indicators often include numbers of 
students progressing to higher education and so on. These tests are 
necessarily short-term in scope (for example, five rather than twenty years) 
and tend to focus on whether taxpayers are receiving value for money. They 
are determined by a neoliberal mindset whose assumptions include the belief 
that market dynamics can and should govern social welfare activities; that the 
results of programmes can be identified and quantified in the relatively short 
term, and so on. 
 
It is not my intention here to condemn efforts to evaluate the benefits of 
publicly funded gifted education programmes. While the need for 
accountability and the responsible use of funding is evident, however, we 
must be aware that this type of evaluation gives us only a partial, macro-level, 
and short-term picture of a much more complex reality having to do with 
individual lives in the present and future. Moreover, in this type of exercise it is 
much easier to identify failures and short-comings than benefits and 
successes. This is especially true if the programme is linked to ambitious 
political targets or aspirations. In any more finely-granulated assessment, the 
voices of the students and other stakeholders such as parents and teachers 
must be sought and given evidential weight.   
 
If asking about the benefits of gifted education programmes is a hard 
question, it is much easier to identify their disadvantages. The two major 
criticisms levelled at gifted education programmes, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, are that they are harmful and that they are unfair.  
 
Non-maleficence 
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Non-maleficence is the principle that holds that, in providing medical care, 
doctors must not make matters worse. This is often formulated as the Latin 
dictum ‘primum non nocere’ – ‘first (or above all) do no harm’. As Gillon points 
out, absolute compliance with this shibboleth of medical ethics is both overly 
simplistic and impossible in practice, as many types of treatment involve 
certain disadvantages (for example, the side effects of a drug whose overall 
effect is curative).  
 
In terms of gifted education, the principle of non-maleficence may be 
considered in light of the questions:  
• Do gifted education programmes cause harm? 
• If so, to whom? 
• Does the harm outweigh any good that can be presumed or 
demonstrated? 
 
There are four main ways in which programmes might be harmful. 
• Programmes could harm gifted children in some way, either educationally 
or by neglecting their wider emotional, social or physical needs. 
• Programmes could be unjust by excluding unrecognised gifted students. 
• Programmes could be harmful to children not regarded as gifted, for 
example by making them feel inferior.  
• Programmes could be harmful to society as a whole, for example by 
reinforcing socio-economic deprivation. 
 
In fact, all of these harms have been imputed to gifted education, either 
generally or with regard to specific programmes. There are those, such as the 
British educationalist John White, who believe that gifted programmes are by 
definition pernicious because they perpetuate false constructs of ability, create 
invidious distinctions between children and demand an undue share of 
resources (White 2006; see also Hart et al 2004). In the United States, Mara 
Sapon-Shevin claims that gifted education programmes foster a type of 
‘educational triage’ that siphons off resources from the majority of children, 
and fosters schools’ self-deception regarding their own effectiveness (Sapon-
Shevin 1994).  
 
A number of critics argue that, because notions of ability are culturally 
constructed, programmes reinforce and exacerbate social inequities. David 
Gillborn, a colleague of White’s and a leading researcher on race and 
education in the UK, cites the UK government’s own statistics showing that 
Black children are under-represented in gifted programmes in England. His 
research indicates that in mainstream schooling Black children are 
disproportionately placed in programmes ‘for which the highest possible grade 
is commonly accepted as a “failure”’, and he contends that gifted education 
programmes perpetuate the assumptions that lead to such outcomes (Gillborn 
2005: 4; DfES 2005: 36). 
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These arguments are typical of criticisms in a number of countries that gifted 
education programmes foster social harm. In terms of harm to individual 
children, critics within and outside the field are concerned that programmes 
might cause harm through inaccurate and unjust identification procedures, 
inappropriate educational strategies, lack of suitable pastoral care, labelling, 
stereotyping, and so on.  
 
The gifted education field has accepted and responded to criticisms of harm, 
with a number of scholars and practitioners (a number of them represented in 
this volume) striving to create more defensible approaches that ameliorate 
real or potential harms to gifted children, those not regarded as gifted, and 
society as a whole. 
 
Some educationalists outside the field, such as White, argue that this is 
insufficient, and that only a paradigm shift that dispenses with the dominant 
models of intelligence and ability will eradicate these harms. The two camps 
could perhaps be summarised as those who believe the baby should not be 
thrown out with the bathwater (reformists within the field), and those who 
believe there is no baby in the bathwater (the abolitionists). 
 
It is of course worth noting that a number of commentators, as well as 
parents, teachers and gifted individuals themselves, point out the harms to 
individuals and society of not having gifted education programmes. 
 
As in medicine, the complete eradication of harm in educational programmes 
is a practical impossibility. The best we can do is to weigh the balance of 
possible harms against possible benefits and construct programmes that 
minimise the former and maximise the latter. Certainly, in seeking to promote 
the greatest good for the greatest number, this approach has an element of 
utilitarianism. It also raises issues about whose interests are to have priority in 
the balancing of good against harm, and leads to a consideration of the fourth 
principle, justice. 
 
Justice 
Justice is the principle appealed to most frequently in public debates over the 
ethics of gifted education programmes. As we have seen, critics argue that 
programmes are unjust by treating gifted and non-gifted children differently, 
and by denying non-gifted children the esteem and resources bestowed on 
gifted students.  Defenders of programmes argue that it is unjust to treat gifted 
children as though they were not gifted, and that they have a right to the type 
of education they need. 
 
Many of these disputes arise out of competing philosophical interpretations of 
justice. One of these is Aristotle’s ‘formal principle’ that defines justice as 
equality: ‘Equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally in 
proportion to the relevant inequalities’ (cited in Gillon 1985: 87-8). This stance 
can be seen to defend gifted education programmes, as it provides a 
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justification for differences in treatment, as long as the ‘inequalities’ are 
‘relevant’ (a point that critics such as White particularly contest).   
 
In terms of distributive justice, the Marxist maxim ‘from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs’, might be seen to justify a levelling of 
educational provision, with the ‘neediest’ being seen as the most deserving. 
This is sometimes interpreted in education to mean that ‘deficits’ always trump 
‘over-endowment’, for example that children with learning difficulties should be 
accorded more resources than children who find learning easy.  
 
Another relevant interpretation is that of John Rawls, who conceives of justice 
as fairness. Rawls hypothesises that a truly fair society would allow deliberate 
inequalities (in the sense of preferential treatment, perquisites and the like) 
only if they work to the advantage of the least advantaged in society (Rawls 
1976). Proponents of gifted education could argue that different treatment for 
gifted students is likely to work to the advantage of society. Critics might 
counter that research evidence points to a weak correlation between 
childhood giftedness and outstanding achievement in adulthood, so the link 
between gifted programmes and social benefit is tenuous. In any case, a 
justification based on Rawls’s theory regards gifted students in an 
instrumental sense, as potential deliverers of future social good, rather than 
as ends in themselves. It is worth noting that both the Marxist and Rawlsian 
positions entail moral duties on gifted individuals, who are enjoined to benefit 
society ‘according to their abilities’. 
 
A theory more in keeping with a deontological approach is offered by the legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who argues in defence of the rights of minorities 
against the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Dworkin 1977). Dworkin’s position 
counters the utilitarian view by asserting that minorities retain certain 
inalienable rights even when this works against the interests of the majority. 
This leads us to the question: Do gifted students have special (minority) rights 
by virtue of their giftedness? 
 
Carrie Winstanley addresses this rather neatly by emphasising that gifted 
students have the same rights as all students, but that the right involved is the 
right to ‘equality of challenge’. This is defined as provision appropriate to 
develop their particular talents as they are, without being linked to an 
overriding age norm (Winstanley 2004). To relate this to both Aristotle’s formal 
principle and the Marxist dictum, the ‘relevant inequality’ becomes a difference 
in the character, not the degree, of need. Consequently the emphasis on ‘to 
each according to his needs’ can justify specific provision for the character of 
gifted students’ needs. This stands as a counter-argument to the notion, often 
found among both educators and the general public, that gifted students’ 
supposed superfluity of ability represents an unfair advantage deserving no 
further enhancement. It also invokes Kant’s categorical imperative by treating 
gifted children as ends in themselves, that is: as children with specific needs 
demanding educational responses. 
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Resolving ethical conflicts 
Ethical values often conflict with one another and educators and policy 
makers must steer a course through competing moral claims. Can medical 
ethics help us devise defensible approaches to gifted education that go some 
way to reconciling such conflicts? One possible route is represented by the 
intuitionist approach of the British philosopher W. D. Ross, which holds that, 
because moral issues are complicated, conflicts between moral imperatives 
should be settled on a case by case basis, guided by moral intuitions (Gillon 
1985: 14-5).  This seems to me a persuasive, if commonsensical, answer, but 
perhaps one that does not leave us much the wiser, or hold much promise for 
policy-makers.  
 
Beauchamp and Childress have elaborated on this notion, however, 
advancing a helpful and rigorous systematisation of the intuitionist approach. 
They offer a set of tests to guide in the selection of one prima facie ethical 
principle or norm over another, in cases where they conflict (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001: 19-22). These tests are general enough to apply to ethical 
conflicts in many spheres, and are relevant to the ethical questions arising 
over gifted education programmes. 
 
The tests are:   
1 ‘Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm than on the 
infringed norm’. People who have rights under a particular principle deserve 
special consideration over people with no comparable rights. Here the 
question is whether gifted children’s rights of ‘equality of challenge’ override 
the rights of other children not to suffer the potential disadvantages of not 
being considered gifted. 
 
2 ‘The moral objective justifying the infringement must have a realistic 
prospect of achievement.’ 
 
3 ‘The infringement is necessary in that no morally preferable alternative 
actions can be substituted.’ 
 
4 ‘The infringement selected must be the least possible infringement, 
commensurate with achieving the primary goal of the action.’ 
 
5 ‘The agent must seek to minimize any negative effects of the infringement.’ 
 
6 ‘The agent must act impartially in regard to all affected parties; that is, the 
agent’s decision must not be influenced by morally irrelevant information 
about any party.’ 
 
Beauchamp and Childress emphasise that moral disagreements can occur 
even when these tests are applied to a situation by people of equal moral 
seriousness and probity. Such tests are unlikely to prevent disagreements, but 
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might help both proponents and critics reflect on their own moral intuitions and 
allow them to understand better those of people holding opposing views. 
 
Features of ethical gifted education programmes 
This overview of the principles of medical ethics and their possible relevance 
to gifted education leads me to suggest the following characteristics of 
ethically defensible gifted education programmes. 
 
Ethically defensible programmes: 
• treat gifted children and young people as ends in themselves 
• prioritise the needs of gifted students over societal agendas seeking to 
make use of them 
• respect the ‘relevant inequalities’ of gifted students while according them 
equal rights to appropriate educational provision  
• are designed to be flexible and permeable, with multiple entry and exit 
opportunities  
• are self-challenging – aware of the fallibility of systems and the fact that 
conceptions of high ability (and pedagogical approaches) are contested 
and change over time  
• respect the autonomy of gifted students by allowing them optimal levels of 
discretion over learning processes and content, and even over their right to 
opt out of a programme 
• are sensitive to individual variances among the gifted population, and 
provide for these 
• seek to prevent harm to gifted children in their emotional, social and 
physical well-being 
• seek to prevent harm to the self-esteem and educational opportunities of 
other children not identified as gifted 
• are outward-looking and sensitive to the larger social context and strive – 
in terms of definitions of ability, identification approaches, entry 
procedures, pedagogy, assessment and pastoral support – to reduce 
rather than perpetuate inequity and disadvantage 
• seek to promote maximum and balanced benefit to gifted children and 
young people in terms of their intellectual development, emotional well-
being, physical health and social fluency. 
 
It is likely that some of these features conflict with one another, and virtually 
certain that the list is not exhaustive. Perhaps indeed there are other 
desiderata for gifted education programmes outside this ethical framework, for 
example, intellectual rigour and faithfulness to the evidence emerging from 
scientific research on aspects of giftedness. 
 
In any case, an exploration of the principles underlying the parallel 
professional and social-welfare domain of medicine can help educators forge 
a better understanding of the ethical issues and values surrounding gifted 
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education. We may hope that this will contribute to the process of improving 
the design, organisation and delivery of ethically defensible programmes. 
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The future of gifted education 
 
Among OECD countries, the UK registers high in both educational excellence 
(a Good Thing) and educational inequality (a Bad Thing). In the past decade 
there have been important attempts to redress inequality of access to gifted 
education, but certain entrenched systemic features of the prevailing ‘factory’ 
model of education limit their effectiveness. Introducing flexibility for the age of 
entry to primary school (later as well as earlier), abolishing ‘age lock-step’ in 
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progression through school and exams, removing the academic–vocational 
divide, and providing multiple opportunities for success would all be helpful 
developments. A few of these are in train already under the ‘personalisation 
agenda’.  
 
Finally, the current inconsequential definitions of ‘giftedness’ as academic 
ability/potential and ‘talent’ as artistic or kinaesthetic ability should be replaced 
with Gagne’s definitions of ‘giftedness’ as potential and ‘talent’ as realised 
performance. This would disarm accusations of essentialism among critics 
and affirm the transformative role of education in nurturing gifts into talents. 
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